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Abstract
Since Kahneman and Tversky (1979), it has been generally recognized that de-
cision makers overweight low probabilities and underweight high probabilities. Of
the several weighting functions that have been proposed, that of Prelec (1998) has
the attractions that it is parsimonious, consistent with much of the available em-
pirical evidence and has an axiomatic foundation. Luce (2001) provided a simpler
derivation based on reduction invariance, rather than compound invariance of Prelec
(1998). This note gives a simpler form of reduction invariance,w h i c hw ec a l lpower
invariance. A more direct derivation of Prelec’s function is given, achieving a further
simpliﬁcation.
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It is now generally accepted that decision makers overweight low probabilities and under-
weight high probabilities. Thus they behave as if they transform the objective (cumula-
tive) probability distribution using an inverted S-shaped weighting function (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992). A number of weighting functions have been proposed. However, the
ﬁrst axiomatically derived weighting function was that of Prelec (1998). His main axiom
was compound invariance. The importance of this axiom is as follows. In expected utility
theory, the product rule for probabilities allows us to reduce a compound lottery to a
simple lottery of the same expected utility. Once we depart from expected utility theory,
we need a rule that plays an analogous role. Compound invariance is a candidate for such
a rule. Luce (2001) proposed the simpler and more easily testable assumption of reduction
invariance. He also provided a simpler derivation of Prelec’s function.
In this note, we provide a more direct proof and achieve a further simpliﬁcation. In the
main part of his proof, Luce transforms the problem to be able to apply Cauchy’s functional
equations f (x + y)=f (x)+f (y) and f (xy)=f (x)f (y). We proceed as follows. We
start from a simpler form of reduction invariance which we call power invariance.W eg i v e





φ(λ) where p is the cumulative probability function and ϕ is some
function of λ,λ > 0.We then use an appropriate functional equation to derive Prelec’s
function. Theorem 2 of section 4 is our main result. For ease of reference, sections 2 and
3 give fairly standard results and deﬁnitions.
2. Lotteries, probability weighting functions, decision weights and
the value of lotteries
Assume n mutually exclusive states of the world, s1,s 2,...,sn,w h e r en ∈ N is a ﬁxed
natural number. State si occurs with probability pi,p i > 0,Σn
i=1pi =1 . An event is a
subset of S = {s1,s 2,...,sn}. The probability of an event A ⊂ S is p(A)=Σ{pi : si ∈ A}.
Let {Ai}
m
i=1, m ∈ N, be a partition of S, i.e., Ai 6= φ,i 6= j =⇒ Ai∩Aj = φ,∪m
i=1Ai = S. Let
x1,x 2,...,xm ∈ R. Then x = {(x1,A 1),(x2,A 2),...,(xm,A m)} is a simple lottery that pays
xi if event Ai occurs. Hence, the lottery x pays xi with probability p(Ai).C o n s i d e ra ne v e n t
A ⊂ S. Let {Ai}
l
i=1, l ∈ N, be a partition of A.T h e nx = {(x1,A 1),(x2,A 2),...,(xl,A l)}
stands for the simple lottery
{(x1,A 1),(x2,A 2),...,(xl,A l),(0,S− A)}
that pays xi if event Ai occurs, but pays 0 if none of the events A1,A 2,...,Al occur. We
shall describe such a lottery as conditional (on A occurring). A compound lottery, which
is a lottery of lotteries, can be given the following recursive deﬁnition.
1Deﬁnition 1 : (i) L0 is the set of simple lotteries, deﬁned above.
(ii) Let Lk+1 = Lk ∪ {{(y1,A 1),(y2,A 2),...,(ym,A m)} : yi ∈ Lk and is conditional on Ai
and {Ai}
m
i=1is any partition of S}.
(iii) L = ∪∞
k=0Lk. L is the set of compound lotteries or, more simply, lotteries.
Often, it suﬃces to give the probability of each outcome, rather than fully specify the
probability space on which a lottery is deﬁned. For example, if p(Ai)=qi,i ti so f t e ns u ﬃ-
cient to indicate the lottery {(x1,A 1),(x2,A 2),...,(xm,A m)} by {(x1,q 1),(x2,q 2),...,(xm,q m)}.
We shall also use the following standard short-hand notation. (x) is the lottery {(x,1)} that
pays 1 with certainty, (x,p) is the lottery {(x,p),(0,1 − p)} that pays x with probability p
but 0 otherwise and ((x,p),q) is the compound lottery {({(x,p),(0,1 − p)},q),(0,1 − q)}
that ’pays’ (x,p) with probability q but 0 otherwise. Our Deﬁnition 1 may appear more
formal than necessary. However, it does facilitate an extension of the concept of the value
of a simple lottery (Deﬁnition 5) to that of a compound lottery (Deﬁnition 6).
Deﬁnition 2 :B yavalue function we mean a strictly increasing function v : R −→ R
such that v (0) = 01.
Deﬁnition 3 :B yaprobability weighting function we mean a strictly increasing function
w :[ 0 ,1]
onto −→ [0,1].
Note that a probability weighting function, w, has a unique inverse, w−1 :[ 0 ,1]
onto −→
[0,1] and that w−1 is strictly increasing. Hence, w−1 is also a probability weighting func-
tion. Furthermore, it follows that w and w−1 are continuous and must satisfy w(0) =
w−1 (0) = 0 and w(1) = w−1 (1) = 1.
Deﬁnition 4 : (Prelec, 1998). By the Prelec function we mean the probability weighting
function w :[ 0 ,1]




Deﬁnition 5 :L e t{(x1,A 1),(x2,A 2),...,(xm,A m)} be a simple lottery, where x1 ≤ x2 ≤
... ≤ xk < 0 ≤ xk+1 ≤ ... ≤ xm. Let w− be the probability weighting function associ-
ated with losses (xi < 0) and w+ the probability weighting function associated with gains
(xi ≥ 0).W ed e ﬁne the decision weights π1,π 2,...,πm as follows,
π1 = w− (p(A1)), if k ≥ 1










;j =2 ,3,...,k; if k>1
1The value function was introduced by Kahnemann and Tversky (1979). They interpret xi = zi − r,
where zi is the ith outcome and r is some reference point for the individual. When zi = r,an a t u r a l
normalization is v(r − r)=v(0) = 0.








;j = k +1 ,...,m − 1; if k<m− 1
πm = w+ (p(Am)), if k<m
Let v : R −→ R be a value function, i.e., a strictly increasing function such that v(0) = 0,
then the value of the simple lottery x = {(x1,A 1),(x2,A 2),...,(xm,A m)} to the decision
maker is given by V (x)=Σm
j=1πjv(xj).
Deﬁnition 6 2: Let y = {(y1,A 1),(y2,A 2),...,(ym,A m)} ∈ Lk+1,s oyi ∈ Lk, and is
conditional on Ai,i =1 ,2,...,m. Let the value of yi be V (yi). Assume that V (y1) ≤
V (y2) ≤ ... ≤ V (yk) < 0 ≤ V (yk+1) ≤ ... ≤ V (yn). Let w− be the probability weighting
function associated with losses and w+ the probability weighting function associated with
gains. We deﬁne the decision weights π1,π2,...,πn as in deﬁnition 5:
π1 = w− (p1), if k ≥ 1










;j =2 ,3,...,k; if k>1








;j = k +1 ,...,m − 1; if k<m− 1
πm = w+ (pm), if k<m
Then the value of y is V (y)=Σm
j=1πjV (yj).
Deﬁnition 7 : Two lotteries, x and y,a r eequivalent if, and only if, they have the same
value : V (x)=V (y).
Example 1 As an illustration, consider Problems 5 and 6 from Kahneman and Tversky
(1984). Problem 5 asks a decision maker to choose between the two compound lotteries
A = ((30,1),0.25) and B = ((45,0.8),0.25). Problem 6 asks the decision maker to choose
between the simple lotteries C =( 3 0 ,0.25) and D =( 4 5 ,0.2). Note that in expected utility
theory A ∼ C and B ∼ D. However empirical evidence shows that, for most decision
makers, A Â B but C ≺ D. On the other hand, using the value function v (x)=x0.6 and
the Prelec probability weighting function w(p)=−e−(−lnp)
0.65
(from Prelec, 1998), gives
V (A)=V ((30,1),0.25) = v (30)w(0.25) = 300.6e−(−ln0.25)0.65
=2 .2349




V (C)=V (30,0.25) = v(30)w(0.25) = 300.6e−(−ln0.25)0.65
=2 .2349
V (D)=V (45,0.20) = v(45)w(0.20) = 450.6e−(−ln0.2)0.65
=2 .513
Hence, for prospect theory, A Â B and C ≺ D, which is in agreement with the empirical
evidence.
2Our Deﬁnition 6 extends the standard deﬁnition of the value of a simple lottery to compound lotteries.
It is in agreement with the usage of Luce (2001) for the special case of compound lotteries of the form
((x,p),q),w h e r e(x,p) is the simple lottery that pays x with probability p. To the best of our knowledge,
this deﬁnition is new.
33. Reduction invariance and Luce’s derivation of Prelec’s function
Deﬁnition 8 : (Luce, 2001). Let λ>0. The probability weighting function, w,s a t i s ﬁes








probability weighting function, w,s a t i s ﬁes reduction invariance if it satisﬁes λ-reduction
invariance for all λ>0.
Theorem 1 : (Luce, 2001). The following are equivalent
(i) The probability weighting function, w,s a t i s ﬁes λ-reduction invariance for λ ∈
{2,3}.
(ii)The probability weighting function, w,s a t i s ﬁes reduction invariance.
(iii) The probability weighting function, w,i st h ePrelec function.
4. ‘Power invariance’ and a simple derivation of Prelec’s function
Deﬁnition 9 (PI): The probability weighting function w satisﬁes power invariance (PI)
if, for all p,q ∈ [0,1],λ∈ (0,∞) and m ∈ N,(w(p))








Deﬁnition 10 (PIPI): The probability weighting function w satisﬁes probability inde-
pendent power invariance (PIPI) if there is a function ϕ : R++ −→ R, such that for all





Theorem 2 : The following are equivalent
(i) The probability weighting function w satisﬁes PI.
(ii) The probability weighting function w satisﬁes PIPI.
(iii) The probability weighting function, w,i st h ePrelec function.
Proof: (i)= ⇒ (ii).L e tp,q ∈ [0,1],λ∈ (0,∞) and n ∈ N and assume that
(w(p))
n = w(q) (4.1)


































ln w(p) is independent of the probability p, hence, the name.
4Here we use the standard notation, w(z)n = w((z)
n).






−y¢¢λ ,y≥ 0 (4.5)
Hence,





In particular, for n =1 ,





From (4.6) and (4.7),
f (n(−lnw(p))) = nf (−lnw(p)) (4.8)
As p varies from 1 down to 0, −lnw(p) varies from 0 up to ∞. Hence, (4.8) gives, for all
n ∈ N and all y ∈ (0,∞),
f (ny)=nf (y) (4.9)
Extend (4.9) from natural numbers to positive reals in the usual way. Let x = 1
ny.























nf (y). Since f is continuous, it follows that, for all x,y ∈ (0,∞),f(xy)=
xf (y). In particular, for y =1 , f (x)=xf (1). Letting φ = f (1),w eg e t ,f o ra l lx ∈
(0,∞),
f (x)=φx (4.10)
Recall that the above derivation is conditional on a given λ ∈ (0,∞).H e n c e ,φ is a function















From (4.11) and (4.12), we get that for all λ,x ∈ (0,∞),g(λx)=g (x)+lnφ(λ). Since g is
strictly monotonic, this functional equation has the unique solution g(x)=l n( βxα),α6=





where α is taken to be positive to ensure that w(p) is strictly increasing, rather than just
strictly monotonic.
Finally, (iii)= ⇒ (i) follows by direct calculation. ¥
5There is a minor error on p42 of Eichhorn (1978): In (2.7.4), the ﬁrst occurrence of λ should be γ.
5From Theorem 1, reduction invariance is equivalent to the probability weighting func-
tion being the Prelec function. From Theorem 2, power invariance is also equivalent to
the probability weighting function being the Prelec function. Hence, we get the following
result.
Corollary 1 : Power invariance is equivalent to reduction invariance of Luce (2001).
References
[1] Eichhorn W. (1978). Functional Equations in Economics. Addison-Wesley.
[ 2 ]K a h n e m a nD .a n dT v e r s k yA .( 1 9 7 9 ) .P r o s p e c tt h e o r y:A na n a l y s i so fd e c i s i o nu n d e r
risk. Econometrica 47. 263-291.
[3] Kahneman D. and Tversky A. (1984). Choices, values and frames. American Psychol-
ogist 39(4). 341-350.
[4] Luce R. D. (2001). Reduction invariance and Prelec’s weighting functions. Journal of
Mathematical Psychology 45. 167-179.
[5] Prelec D. (1998). The probability weighting function. Econometrica 60. 497-528.
[6] Tversky A. and Kahneman D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory : Cumulative rep-
resentation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5. 297-323.
6